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tion over prisoners' section 1983 claims demonstrates that the federal
courts will offer the prisoners this sympathetic forum and enable them to
take an active role in correcting unconstitutional conditions and proce-
dures in the state prisons.
WILLIAM SIDNEY ALDRIDGE
Federal Jurisdiction-The Status of Public Officials as "Per-
sons" Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the right of
a tenured public school teacher to continued employment is a protected
property interest1 that cannot be taken away without due process.2
The employee facing removal is generally entitled to a hearing on the
charges. brought against him in which he can confront and cross-
examine witnesses.3 Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edge!ield County School District4 and
Thomas v. Ward greatly enhanced the opportunity for the victim of
prisoners experience within the prison grievance system and parole system. James
Hoffa, former president of the Teamsters' Union, commented on his observations of the
parole board while he was in prison: "I know of an individual who served 27 years in
prison and was allowed exactly three minutes to appear in front of the parole board and
then they said, Well, we want to study you two more years. What they found out in 29
years that they couldn't find out in 27 I'll never find out." Hoffa, Criminal Justice from
the Inside, 56 JuticATo'i 422, 425 (1973). Hopefully prisoners' section 1983 suits will
be effective in eliminating this type of process.
One lawyer seemed to sum up the situation best: "It is often difficult for attorneys,
or courts, whose entire universe revolves around rational decision-making, to fully
comprehend the total and arbitrary power which has characterized prison authorities'
control over the lives of prisoners. Administrative decisions which drastically affect the
lives and liberty of thousands of prisoners have often been made on the flimsiest of
information, without review." Brief for the National Council on Crime and Delinquen-
cy as Amicus Curiae at 3, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
1. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (dictum). In Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court expanded Roth to include not only those
teachers who were formally tenured, but also those who had an implied or "de facto"
tenure. Such tenure is to be ascertained by an examination of the historical policies
and practices of the institution. 408 U.S. at 602-03. For a similar statutory doctrine
see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-142 (1975) (establishing formal dismissal procedures for
teachers with more than three consecutive years of service in one school district).
2. Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Fraley, 470
F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
3. McNeil v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 1973).
4. 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975).
5. Civil No. 74-1541 (4th Cir., Nov. 24, 1975).
42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983
a defective proceeding to secure restitutionary and injunctive relief
against school authorities. The court held that individual members of
a school board can be sued in their official capacity as "persons"
within the meaning of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act6 in an
original federal district court proceeding. 7 The practical effect of these
decisions may be far-reaching, in that they seemingly open the
treasuries of local governmental units to equitable reimbursement judg-
ments in section 1983 actions. Furthermore, Burt and Thomas mani-
fest the Fourth Circuit's continued resistance to Supreme Court deci-
sions narrowing the scope of remedies against public bodies in civil
rights actions.8
In the spring of 1970, the Board of Trustees of the Edgefield
County, South Carolina, School District released teacher Helen Burt on
the ground of incompetence. In May, 1972, she brought suit under
section 1983 against the school board and each individual member of
the Board alleging that her discharge was racially motivated and that
she was denied adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing. She
sought 25,000 dollars for damages to her "character and person," plus
reinstatement9 with back pay and retirement benefits. Before trial, she
dropped her damage claim, as well as her claim for reinstatement, but
retained her demands for back pay and retirement contributions. 10
The district court supported the Board's finding of incompetence but
determined that Mrs. Burt had been denied a hearing with due process
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of the United States or by any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States; ....
The Supreme Court has interpreted section 1343(3) as conferring jurisdiction only
when a proper cause of action is stated under section 1983. See City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1973). See generally Comment, The Civil Rights Act
and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 144, 147-51 (1961).
8. See Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Lank-
ford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966).
9. 521 F.2d at 1203-04 n.l. By the time of trial Mrs. Burt had reached the nor-
mal retirement age of 65.
10. Id. at 1203.
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safeguards. She was awarded back pay but not retirement fund
contributions.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found it impossible to determine
whether the lower court judgment ran against the trustees of the school
district as individuals or as representatives of the school board. It
vacated the judgment"' and remanded the case for a clarification of the
action as one for damages1 2 or equitable reimbursment. 18  The court
dismissed the action against the Board as an official body since it
did not constitute a "person" under section 1983; however, it ruled
that members of the Board acting in their official capacities were
proper "persons' under section 1983 and thus subject to claims for
equitable relief.' 4
The factual circumstances of Thomas v. Ward closely paralleled
those of Burt. Lyle Thomas was dismissed from his teaching position
by the Winston-Salem/Forsyth County, North Carolina, School Board
following a hearing in which he was deprived of the opportunity to con-
front witnesses testifying by affidavit against him.' 5 The district court
11. The court found that the judgment on its face ran directly against the board
members as individuals, and ordered the named defendants to pay over damages to the
plaintiff. 521 F.2d at 1204 n.2. Upon that determination, it further ruled that the trial
court committed error in not allowing the defendant's demand for a jury trial. Id. at
1206. This result apparently reflects a change in judicial attitude from the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n.8
(4th Cir. 1966), in which the court ruled that an action for back pay did not constitute
an action for damages, but rather only an integral part of the equitable remedy of reim-
bursement, and thus afforded no constitutional right to a jury trial. See Comment, Jury
Trial in Employment Discrimination Cases-Constitutionally Mandated?, 53 TXA L
R v. 483 (1975).
12. The judges were in disagreement as to the proper measure of damages if thejudgment ran against the board members as individuals. Judge Craven would allow
damages only for the value of the broken employment contract, which he found only
nominal in the case of an incompetent teacher. 521 F.2d at 1204-05. Judges Winter
and 'Russell would allow full recovery of back pay as damages. Id. at 1207-08, 1209.
13. The Fourth Circuit has long regarded suits for back pay as equitable in nature
since such awards serve only to restore claimants to their rightful economic status. In
Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 3.60 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966), the court
ruled that in section 1983 litigation, back pay is simply an integral part of the equitable
remedy of reinstatement. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.
1971) (back pay award under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g), ruled simply part of statutory equitable remedy); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Horton v. Orange County Bd. of
Educ., 464 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1972), in which discharged teacher was not entitled to
reinstatement but was allowed to recover as "damages" her new pecuniary loss for the
period she was disemployed to the date of trial. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDcBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REME DS § 12.25, at 928-31 (1973).
14. 521 F.2d at 1205.
15. Thomas received a hearing in which the only evidence against him was let-
tert of school officials, his personal file, and affidavits of several students who were later
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ruled the hearing improper and ordered that Thomas be given another
hearing. The second, constitutionally proper hearing confirmed his
incompetence. Thomas filed another complaint in federal district court
against the Board and each of its members, requesting reinstatement
and back pay. The district court dismissed the action, but on appeal
the Fourth Circuit ruled that the defective first hearing at least entitled
Thomas to back pay until the time of his second hearing.16 On the
basis of Burt, the court reiterated that school board members acting in
their official capacities are "persons" under section 1983.17
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 1983
The Fourth Circuit's approach in Burt and Thomas represents
another attempt by one of the lower federal courts to confront the con-
fusion surrounding the meaning of "person" in section 1983. Origin-
ally enacted in 1871,18 section 1983 attempted to protect newly emanci-
pated blacks against violence from the Ku Klux Klan with the open
acquiescence of state and local authorities. 9 It provided a federal
forum for actions against municipal and state officers who failed actively
to enforce the law--especially the fourteenth amendment.2 0  Like
most of the early civil rights legislation, the statute lay practically
dormant until the 1950's.21 Its first modem interpretation came in the
landmark case of Monroe v. Pape,12 in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld the right of six children and their parents to
assert a damage action against Chicago policemen for unlawful invasion
of their home. However, after careful scrutiny of the legislative
history,2 3 the Monroe Court concluded that Congress did not intend
shown to be disciplinary problems themselves. No witnesses were sworn and Thomas
thus had no opportunity for cross-examination. The trial court found on this record a
failure of due process. Civil No. 74-1541 at 4.
16. Id. at 9-10.
17. Id. at 11.
18. Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
19. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 662 passim (1871). See also Kates
and Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45
S. CAL. L. REV. 131 (1972).
20. For accounts of the attrocities reported to the Congress during the debates on
the Act see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. (1871).
21. See generally E. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 Mic. L REv. 1323 (1952); Note, The Proper Scope of Civil Rights Acts, 66 HAv.
L. REv. 1285 (1953).
22. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
23. Justice Douglas based his majority opinion on the rejection of the Sherman
Amendment that would have made local governments liable for riots or violence occur-
ring within their jurisdiction. Id. at 188-92. See CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
704-05, 725, 800-01 (1871). See generally Kates and Kouba, supra note 19, at 131.
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municipalities to be subject to the Act and that consequently they were
not "persons"' as defined in the statute.24 Since the city could not be
sued under section 1983, the Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. section 134325 and dismissed the action against the
city. The Monroe result, limiting actions against municipalities, has been
interpreted to include many local political subdivisions, including school
boards. 20  The decision received much criticism, 27 and almost imme-
diately lower federal courts sought methods to circumvent its meaning.
Twelve years later, the Court again confronted the Monroe
situation. In Moor v. County of Alameda28 petitioners brought damage
actions under section 1983 against several law enforcement officers and
against the County on the theory that the County was vicariously liable
under state law for the officers' unconstitutional acts. Since under their
construction of the California Tort Claims Act,29 the County in effect
consented to be sued in state court, petitioners asserted that it had also
waived its immunity in the federal forum and thus could be treated as
a "person" for section 1983 purposes. Furthermore, they argued that
the Court's policy of exclusion of governmental units from section 1983
liability effectively denied plaintiffs an adequate recovery. In com-
plainants' view, personal actions against individual officers did not pro-
vide a deterrent against official infringement of federal rights, since
often the officers proved judgment proof or were protected by some
type of official immunity.30 In spite of these policy considerations, the
24. 365 U.S. at 191-92.
25. See note 7 supra.
26. See Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974).
27. See Kates and Kouba, supra note 19, at 132-36; McCormack, Federalism and
Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA.
L R V. 1 (1974); Comment, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, 55 U. M-N. L REv. 1201, 1205-07 (1971).
28. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
29. CAL. Gov'T CoDn § 815.2(a) (West 1966).
30. The concept of the immunity of government officials sprang out of the com-
mon law's recognition of the necessity of permitting officials to perform their official
functions free from personal liability. This was modified in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that government officials are not totally
exempt from liability under section 1983. They were granted only a qualified immunity
contingent upon such factors as the scope of discretion and responsibility of the officers
plus the circumstances as they appeared at the time of the unconstitutional event. 416
U.S. at 247.
The latest standard for immunity in the school board disciplinary context (which
closely parallels the teacher suspensions in Burt and Thomas) appeared in Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975): "A compensatory award will be appropriate only if
the school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such
disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith." Id. at 322. See also Note, Constil-
1066 [Vol. 54
42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983
Court adhered to the rationale of Monroe and declared that Alameda
County was not a "person" under section 1983.
Soon after Moor, the Supreme Courts decision in City of Kenosha
v. Bruno31 apparently closed the issue of local government liability
under section 1983. In Kenosha appellee liquor store operators
brought an action under section 1983 claiming deprivation of due
process in the City's refusal to renew their one-year liquor license.
They sought only declaratory and injunctive relief.3 2 Although the
jurisdictional issue did not surface at the trial stage, the Supreme Court
dismissed the action against the City on the ground that it was not a
"person' for section 1983 purposes. Justice Rehnquist's opinion
concluded:
We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe,
or in the language actually used by Congress, to suggest that the
generic word "person" in § 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated
application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of
the relief sought against them. Since, as the Court held in Monroe,
'Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within
the ambit of' § 1983. . . they are outside of its ambit for purposes
of equitable relief as well as for damages.33
The mandate of Kenosha seems clear. The Court has specifically
excluded municipalities and other local governmental units from "per-
son!' status under section 1983 whether the suit be couched in legal
or equitable terms.
Although the Supreme Court has emphatically denied municipal
liability under section 1983, it has not yet discussed the situation
presented by Burt and Thomas, in which the individual members of
the public body are sued in their representative capacities. Clearly,
Monroe sanctions suits against public officials as individuals, but
damage actions against such persons are often thwarted by various
tutional Law-Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the Doctrine of Executive Immu-
nity Automatically Bar a Suit for Damages Brought against State Officials in their Indi-
vidual Capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Scheuer v. Rhodes, 24 CAmT. U. L REv. 164
(1974); Note, Sovereign Immunity-Scheuer v. Rhodes: Reconciling Section 1983
Damage Actions with Governmental Immunities, 53 N.C.L. REV. 439 (1974).
31. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
32. 412 U.S. at 508. The district court declared the statute in question unconsti-
tutional, relying on two Seventh Circuit decisions holding officials to be proper "per-
sons" in an action seeking equitable relief, namely, Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d
1084 (7th Cir. 1969), and Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
412 U.S. at 511. See generally Comment, Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil
Rights Act: Monroe v. Pape Reconsidered, 43 U. CoLo. L. REv. 105 (1971).
33. 412 U.S. at 513 (citation omitted).
1976] 1067
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
forms of official immunity.3" Likewise, an injunctive decree against an
individual may fall outside the scope of his authority as an individual
and thus block effective relief. 8 Suits against board members as offi-
cials would not encounter either of these obstacles. It would seem,
however, that a judgment requiring municipal officials to pay damages
or reinstate an employee is precisely equivalent to requiring the city
to do so. Many lower federal courts have adopted this.reasoning"8 in
the wake of Monroe and Kenosha. In Taliaferro v. State Council of
Higher Educaton,37 for example, one court reasoned:
The logic of Bruno seems inescapable. . . . Since this Court can
perceive no distinction in principle between a state or county and
the agencies or institutions into which it divides itself, or the agents
in their official capacities through which it acts, the Court can reach
no other conclusion than that the State Council of Higher Educa-
tion, and the named defendants in their official capacities, are not
'persons' for purposes of either monetary or injunctive relief under
§ 1983.38
The Supreme Court has adopted the same reasoning in the
analogous context of state immunity under the eleventh amendment
from prosecution in the federal courts. Plaintiffs bringing suits against
state officials in their representative capacities often are confronted by
jurisdictional barriers by which the officials seek to define the action
against them as one running against the state. 9 If the court character-
izes the suit as one in essence against the state, it is compelled to dis-
miss the action for lack of jurisdiction, unless the state waives its
immunity. In such suits against state officials, the Supreme Court has
generally held that the classification of a suit as one against the state
is to be determined by the nature and effect of the relief sought.40
Thus, when an action involves recovery of money from the state
treasury, the state is the real party in interest, and its officials are
entitled to invoke the eleventh amendment even though they are
34. See note 30 supra. See also Kates and Kouba, supra note 19, at 131-32; The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 252, 256-63 (1973).
35. Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1963).
36. See Patton v. Conrad Area School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 410 (D. Del. 1975);
Needleman v. Bohlen, 386 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1974); Hines v. D'Artois, 383 F.
Supp. 184 (W.D. La. 1974).
37. 372 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Va. 1974).
38. Id. at 1381-82. See also Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971).
39. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
40. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459 (1945). See also Ken.
necott Copper Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Great Northern Life Ins.
Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
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nominal defendants.4 ' Applying this rationale, the Court has granted
immunity to individual state officials in actions for tax :refunds4 2 and
retroactive welfare benefits.4"
While interpretations of the eleventh amendment have no binding
effect on the definition of a "person" for the purposes of section 1983,
the techniques employed to determine whether a suit against state offi-
cials is actually a suit against the state appear applicable in deciding
whether an action against municipal authorities is in essence an action
against the city and thus subject to the Monroe and Kenosha exemption.
In an attempt to avoid this seemingly logical approach, courts allowing
suits against officials in their representative capacities have developed
two lines of reasoning to justify their decisions. The first argument
adopts by analogy the limitations on state immunity defenses in equit-
able proceedings,44 while the second approach simply confines Monroe
and Kenosha to their literal holdings without regard to the rationale
underlying them. The Fourth Circuit in Burt and Thomas adopted
both of these approaches.
EX PARTE YOUNG AND EQUITABLE RELImE.
In the landmark decision of Ex Parte Young45 the Supreme Court
ruled that the eleventh amendment did not bar an action to enjoin the
Minnesota Attorney General from enforcing an unconstitutional rail-
road rate statute. In order to reach its result, the Court resorted to
the creation of a legal fiction:
[I]n every case where an official claims to be acting under the au-
thority of the State. . . the use of the name of the State to en-
force an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a pro-
ceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the
State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an ille-
gal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of
the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is
void because unconstitutional. . . . [Ie is in that case stripped
of his official or representative character and is subjected in his per-
son to the consequences of his individual conduct.46
The Young result clearly exalted form over substance, since it disquali-
fied a suit against the Minnesota Attorney General but allowed the
41. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas., 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
42. Id.
43. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
44. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HIAv. L. REv. 252 (1973).
45. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
46. Id. at 159-60.
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same action against the person occupying that office. Obviously, the
effect of the injunction on the State of Minnesota in either situation
was the same.47
In Ford Motor Company v. Department of Treasury of Indiana,48
the Supreme Court rejected the application of the Young fiction to suits
for monetary remedies. In addition to the Department, the complain-
ants joined the Governor, the Treasurer, and the State Auditor in their
official capacities as the Board of the Treasury Department. Despite
the joinder of these individuals, the Court determined that the payment
of back taxes from the state treasury clearly involved direct action
against the State's resources and sustained eleventh amendment immu-
nity.49 After Ford Motor, therefore, it appeared that equitable actions
could be brought against state officials but that the eleventh amend-
ment barred damage actions against them. However, the precedents
left uncertain the result in a suit seeking an equitable reimbursement
remedy accompanied by a claim for injunctive relief.
In 1974, Edelman v. Jordan50 confronted that specific issue. Plain-
tiff welfare recipients brought an action alleging denial of equal protec-
tion in the Illinois method51 of administering federally supported family
assistance. The district court ordered Illinois to comply with federal
guidelines for welfare distributions and, in addition, required state
welfare officials to release retroactive benefits wrongly withheld from
eligible applicants. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court's result and concluded that the Young rationale properly sanc-
tioned the grant of a monetary award in the nature of equitable
restitution."Z
In reversing the circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court went
beyond a simple characterization of the suit as "equitable" or "legal"
and emphasized instead the nature of the relief sought. Since the
funds would come directly from the state treasury, the Court concluded
that the rule in Ford Motor applied and that the eleventh amendment
effectively barred the action for retroactice payments.63  Edelman
47. See McCormack, supra note 27, at 36.
48. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
49. Id. at 464.
50. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
51. Under Illinois procedure, grants were authorized beginning only with tho
month in which an application was approved. Id. at 665. The federal law allowed ret-
roactive payments for all prior eligible months. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(6) (1972).
52. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
53. 415 U.S. at 665.
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therefore limited the Young rationale to suits for prospective relief
only. Any suit requiring retroactive payment from a state treasury,
regardless of the label placed on it, was deemed a suit against the state,
irrespective of the naming of officials as nominal parties.
Given the Supreme Court's conclusion that a suit against a
welfare official for reimbursement is in essence an action against the
state, to insist that an action against a school board official for back pay
is not in essence an action against the county defies logic as well as
the thrust of the Supreme Court's decisions. Yet many federal courts
have adopted this viewpoint54 by refusing to consider the impact and
rationale of Edelman in equitable actions against local officials. The
Fourth Circuit in Burt, for example, cited two pre-Edelman circuit court
decisions 5 interpreting officials as "persons" for equitable relief.
Neither of these cases, however, could have considered the effect of
Edelman on the Young fiction. In addition, the court cited two Su-
preme Court cases56 in which plaintiffs were awarded equitable relief
against local officials under section 1983. Both of these cases involved
prospective relief only and consequently did not confront the issue of
equitable reimbursement.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF MONROE AND KENOSHA
A second method used by the lower courts to define officials as
"persons" under section 1983 involves the limitation of the Monroe
rationale to its literal holding. Although recognizing the clear ratio
decidendi of Monroe and Kenosha, these decisions allow jurisdiction
against the officials simply because neither case specifically denied it.57
The Fourth Circuit took this approach in Harper v. Kloster,5 its first
expression on section 1983 jurisdiction after Kenosha. In Harper, four
black employees sued the City of Baltimore, its mayor, and the city
54. See Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (lst Cir.
1974); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974);
Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); Canty v.
City of Richmond Police Dept., 383 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. Va. 1974).
55. Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974);
Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 197-4). These cases
were cited at 521 F.2d at 1205.
56. Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Douglas v. City of Jean-
ette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). These cases were cited at 521 F.2d at 1205.
57. See Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
See also Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Il. 1974); Richmond
Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Va. 1974).
58. 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
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council as officials under section 1983 for racial discrimination in hiring
and promotion. The district court granted substantial relief in the form
of injunctions to prevent further discriminatory practices."" On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit dismissed the action against the City of Baltimore
on the basis of Kenosha but affirmed jurisdiction over the officials.
The court specifically failed to give Kenosha "any wider application,"
although acknowledging that the dismissal of the City as a party would
have absolutely no effect on the district court's relief. 0
Harper's narrow reading of Kenosha may be justifiable, even in
the post-Edelman context, since the remedy sought in Harper was
prospective injunctive relief. In Burt and Thomas, however, the cir-
cuit court extended its application of the restrictive Harper approach 1
to cases involving equitable reimbursement. Although the Burt trial
court 2 and other district judges within the circuit08 have afforded
Kenosha considerable weight, the Fourth Circuit seems willing to enter-
tain suits against municipal officials in their representative capacities
until the Supreme Court specifically rules otherwise. Thus, it appears
that the Fourth Circuit will continue to ignore the well reasoned
approach of Edelman and the clear import of Kenosha.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although in neither Burt nor Thomas did the Fourth Circuit
discuss the policies lying behind its construction of "person" under sec-
tion 1983, that court and other lower courts seem cognizant of the
results of extending the Monroe and Kenosha rationale to its logical
conclusion. 4 The elimination of municipal officials as proper defend-
ants would practically deny plaintiffs effective redress under section
1983 against unconstitutional actions by municipal bodies,06 since
actions against the individual board members almost inevitably will face
59. Harper v. Mayor and City Council, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973).
60. "The decree of the district court will be just as effective if it applies only to
the defendants, excluding Baltimore City, a municipal corporation, as if Baltimore City
were also a defendant." 486 F.2d at 1138.
61. 521 F.2d at 1205.
62. Id. at 1204-05.
63. See Moye v. City of Raleigh, 503 F.2d 631, 635 n.11 (4th Cir. 1974); Rich-
mond Black Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 386 F. Supp. 151 (E.D. Va.
1974); Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Va. 1974).
64. See, e.g., Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist. 612, 509 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir.
1975).
65. See authorities cited notes 27 & 34 supra. See also Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197, 202 (4th-Cir. 1966).
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assertions of official immunity."s Nevertheless, the MonroelKenosha
rationale is plainly designed to limit actions against local governments.
In Monroe,6 7 Moor v. Alameda County,68 and Kenosha,"9 the Supreme
Court at least implicitly rejected these policy arguments by relying on
distant legislative history to support its statutory construction.7°
Through its narrow reading of that history, the Supreme Court has
determined that section 1983 will not be used as a statute to adjudicate
any injured party's constitutional claims against municipal authorities.
Closing the loophole created by cases such as Burt and Thomas
does not guarantee that plaintiffs will have no recourse, since several
jurisdictional alternatives exist. Many plaintiffs will be able to meet
the 10,000 dollar federal question requirement under 28 U.S.C.
section 1331. 71 Claims against municipalities under state law may also
be heard by federal courts under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.72
Finally, some commentators have asserted that federal courts should
allow claims under 28 U.S.C. section 1343(3)73 regardless of whether
they state a proper cause of action under section 1983.
66. See note 30 supra.
67. 365 U.S. at 191.
68. 411 U.S. at 700-01.
69. 412 U.S. at 516-20 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. See authorities cited note 27 supra.
71. 28 U.S.C. section 1331(a) provides: 'The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."
Although this provision grants federal jurisdiction, the real issue in the section 1331
context is the ability to state a cause of action for which relief might be granted. Some
courts attempt to expand the decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which granted a direct cause of action against
federal officers directly from the Constitution. Attempts to formulate a federal cause
of action against municipal officials have met with mixed success. See Smetanka v. Bor-
ough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp. 1366, 1377-78 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (rejection of first
amendment claim); Payne v. Mertens, 343 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (re-
jecting fourth amendment claim). But see City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. at 516
(Brennan, J., concurring); Maybanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913, 914-16 (ED. Pa.
1974) (claim under thirteenth and fourteenth amendments allowed). See generally
Bodensteiner, Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against "Non-Persons" for the Dep-
rivation of Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. L. REv. 213 (1974); Dellinger, Of Rights
and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAv. L. Rv. 1532, 1558-59 (1972);
Note, Municipal Liability in Damages for Violations of Constitutional Rights-Fash-
ioning a Cause of Action Directly from the Constitution-Brault v. Town of Milton,
7 CONN. L. REV. 552 (1975).
72. See Note, A Federal Cause of Action Against a Municipality for Fourth
Amendment Violations by Its Agents, 42 GEo. WAsH. L. REa. 850, 863 (1974). But
see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
73. See Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10, 12 .(5th Cir. 1969); Bodensteiner,
supra note 71, at 229-34. But see Comment, The Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe,
49 CALIF. L. REv. 145, 148 (1961).
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If existing jurisdictional procedures prove inadequate, Congress
may change the statutes in any of three ways: (1) it could amend
section 1983 to include specifically local governments as "persons";74
(2) it could amend 28 U.S.C. section 1343 to confer original federal
jurisdiction in any claim involving a deprivation of civil rights; and (3)
it could simply add a new statute to allow jurisdiction over local govern-
mental units to redress civil rights. These alternatives seem superior to
the current lower court policy of ignoring the logical Edelman approach.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court on three occasions has unequivocably
declared that Congress did not intend local governmental units to be
subject to liability as "persons" under section 1983. 71 Despite this
mandate, the Fourth Circuit in Burt v. Board of Trustees and Thomas
v. Ward allowed plaintiffs to recover equitable back pay judgments
against defendant school boards simply by naming the members as
nominal defendants. In light of recent Supreme Court pronounce-
ments in the analogous state sovereignty context, the reasoning in these
cases seems strained and illogical. The division of authority on the
issue indicates the need for further Supreme Court definition of
"person" in the section 1983 context. The ultimate solution, however,
would be a congressional overhaul of the federal civil rights statutes
to provide an effective method of redressing constitutional wrongs in
a federal forum.
JERRY ALAN REESE
Judicial Discipline-The North Carolina Commission System
"Courts, be they high or low, should and must be like Caesar's
wife, above suspicion. Any other standard is one which undermines the
trust and confidence of the average citizen in his government."' Re-
cently, North Carolina took steps to ensure that its judiciary exhibit this
74. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, A REPORT ON EQUAL
PRO'rECION IN nmE SouTH 179-80 (1965). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RoHs, 1961 REPORT, BK. 5: JUs CE, at 73-75 (1961).
75. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. at 710 n.27.
1. In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 698, 304 A.2d 587, 607 (1973).
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